The structure of creative cognition in the human brain by Rex E. Jung
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 08 July 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00330
The structure of creative cognition in the human brain
Rex E. Jung*, Brittany S. Mead , Jessica Carrasco and Ranee A. Flores
Department of Neurosurgery, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Edited by:
Zbigniew R. Struzik, The University
of Tokyo, Japan
Reviewed by:
Anna Abraham, Kuwait University,
Kuwait
Scott B. Kaufman, New York
University, USA
*Correspondence:
Rex E. Jung, Department of
Neurosurgery, University of New
Mexico, 801 University SE, Suite
202, Albuquerque, 87106 NM, USA
e-mail: rex.jung@gmail.com
Creativity is a vast construct, seemingly intractable to scientific inquiry—perhaps due to
the vague concepts applied to the field of research. One attempt to limit the purview of
creative cognition formulates the construct in terms of evolutionary constraints, namely
that of blind variation and selective retention (BVSR). Behaviorally, one can limit the
“blind variation” component to idea generation tests as manifested by measures of
divergent thinking. The “selective retention” component can be represented by measures
of convergent thinking, as represented by measures of remote associates. We summarize
results from measures of creative cognition, correlated with structural neuroimaging
measures including structural magnetic resonance imaging (sMRI), diffusion tensor
imaging (DTI), and proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy (1H-MRS). We also review
lesion studies, considered to be the “gold standard” of brain-behavioral studies. What
emerges is a picture consistent with theories of disinhibitory brain features subserving
creative cognition, as described previously (Martindale, 1981). We provide a perspective,
involving aspects of the default mode network (DMN), which might provide a “first
approximation” regarding how creative cognition might map on to the human brain.
Keywords: creativity, default mode network, blind variation, divergent thinking, structural neuroimaging,magnetic
resonance spectroscopy, diffusion tensor imaging
DEFINITIONS
Creativity is a complex and vast construct that has been vital to
the progress of human civilization and very likely the develop-
ment of human reasoning processes. Indeed, the immense array
of creative endeavors encompasses the works of such disparate
activities as those undertaken by painters, sculptors, nuclear engi-
neers, landscape architects, graphic designers, and software devel-
opers: how do we imagine to capture such a broad construct? At
the onset there should be noted two major potential pitfalls for
creativity/neuroimaging research: the singular focus on the iconic
genius—known as Big “C”—at the expense of the vast majority of
creative endeavors undertaken by the other 99% of the distribu-
tion of creative endeavors—known as little “c” (Stein, 1953), and
undue focus on an encompassing definition around which largely
unedifying academic arguments often ensue (e.g., “gene” has no
commonly accepted definition although research in this area pro-
gresses apace; the same can be said for cognitive constructs such
as “intelligence” and “creativity”) (Arden et al., 2010). To be sure,
much of value can be learned from the historiometric assess-
ment of great giants of creative history (think Mozart, Einstein,
Van Gogh—the list goes on), divining how they might have
lived, what formative experiences they might have had, what their
neurological makeup might have looked like (Simonton, 1984);
unfortunately, these individuals and their magnificent brains are
(save Einstein) lost to history. Just as fortunate, individuals who
make up the vast underbelly of the “c” portion of the distribution
avail themselves to us to this day, indeed offer themselves readily
to most neuroimaging experiments (in exchange only for some
nominal compensation, a.k.a. “beer money”).
With these and several other well articulated caveats in mind
(Dietrich, 2007), any truly plausible definition of creativity, intel-
ligence, or other broad behavioral construct must be applicable
not just to humans, and not just to exceptionally talented humans
(i.e., “genius”), but also to other species and across evolution-
ary time. Thus, for the purposes of this neuroscience of creativity
discussion, we adopt a broadly accepted definition of creativity,
which refers to the production of something both novel and use-
ful (Stein, 1953; Martindale, 1999; Runco and Jaeger, 2012). This
definition is plausible, is broadly applicable, and would appear to
hold true across much of evolutionary time. As such, it also refers
to the workings of the brain.
CREATIVITY AS BLIND VARIATION AND SELECTIVE
RETENTION
While the varieties of creative expression are many (i.e., domain
specific), the cognitive processes critical to its manifestation (i.e.,
domain general) are likely to be relatively few; thus, in order to
make the problem tractable, researchers have attempted to iden-
tify cognitive processes central to creative cognition. In 1960,
Donald Campbell attempted to explain the development of cre-
ative thought with a theory of “blind variation and selective
retention” (BVSR). Campbell presents the process of “achiev-
ing innovation” as the next step in the evolutionary progres-
sion from blind floundering to an intelligent knowledge process
(Campbell, 1960). Campbell notes similarities between “trial-
and-error” problem solving and natural selection in evolution,
namely “a mechanism for introducing variation, a consistent
selection process, and a mechanism for preserving and reproduc-
ing the selected variations (p. 381).” The emphasis on “blind” as
opposed to “random” is important, as the variations are seen to
be independent of the environmental conditions from which they
might have sprung. This simple law states that “the greater the
heterogeneity and volume of trials the greater the chance of a pro-
ductive innovation (p. 395).” This law has been codified by Dean
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Keith Simonton, who provides extensive and compelling support
for such a BVSR system underlying creative cognition (Simonton,
1999). Critiques to the notion of BVSR underlying creative cog-
nition have also been raised (Gabora, 2011). The blind-variation
component reflects elements of divergent thinking measures (e.g.,
tell me as many ways you can think of to use a brick) insofar
as it hinges on the ability to generate a large number of novel
ideas. Simultaneously, as scores of exploratory thought trials are
filtered through the mind, the selection criteria are eventually met
and the innovative process is terminated. This ability to eliminate
the absurd and frivolous from the meaningful and appropriate
makes up the “selective retention” component of Campbell’s the-
ory, and is also measured by the usefulness or appropriateness of
the new use for the common item (e.g., BRICK = to grind corn
into meal) (Campbell, 1960). Criticism of the BVSR theory rely
on its potential lack of falsifiability (Simonton, 2010), although it
stands as a compelling model for cognitive processes underlying
creativity.
NEUROIMAGING STUDIES OF CREATIVITY
The majority of psychometric research studies in creativity
have emerged in the latter half of the 20th century (Guilford,
1968; Torrance, 1974; Amabile, 1982), but little progress has
been made regarding brain correlates of this construct prior
to the advent of modern neuroimaging techniques. Whereas,
neuroimaging studies of intelligence have a 20-year history and
span dozens of studies (Jung and Haier, 2007), similar stud-
ies of creativity are relatively few although spanning roughly
the same period of time. Neuroimaging of the creative process
can be undertaken to assess brain traits [structural magnetic
resonance imaging (sMRI); diffusion tensor imaging (DTI); pro-
ton magnetic resonance spectroscopy] and brain states (func-
tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Magnetoencephalography;
Electroencephalography) associated with task performance. Both
the behavioral and neuroimaging approaches can be combined
to select people as high and low on trait measures of creativity
and then compare the state of their brain functioning as they per-
form creative tasks. For example, imaging studies of intelligence
have identified a network of areas where intelligence test scores
correlate to brain features; these areas are distributed through-
out the brain but most prominent in parietal and frontal areas
(Haier and Jung, 2007; Jung and Haier, 2007). Another approach
is to image the state of brain function as it fluctuates in people
performing creative tasks. Of course, the field is not sufficiently
well developed to have focused specifically upon subcompo-
nents of creative cognition, although some studies do distinguish
between measures of convergent vs. divergent reasoning (Fink
and Neubauer, 2006), insight (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), implicit
thought processes (Haider, 1992; Kaufman et al., 2010), and other
promising candidates, most recently those of “conceptual expan-
sion” and “constraints of examples” (analogous to “BV” and “SR”
respectively of BVSR) (Abraham and Windmann, 2007).
Methodologically, it is likely impossible to capture someone
being truly creative in a laboratory setting; rather, we describe
ways by which to measure this cognitive construct by capturing
particular elements found to be important to the creative pro-
cess including, “insight,” “convergent,” and “divergent” cognitive
processes. Divergent tasks are characterized by having many pos-
sible answers as opposed to having one correct answer (i.e.,
“convergent thinking”) characteristic of most measures of intelli-
gence and reasoning. We also describe a “Consensual Assessment
Technique” (Amabile, 1982) by which independent judges might
rank the creative products of each subject, with high inter-rater
reliability, from which a “composite creativity score” can be com-
piled. Following intelligence studies, one approach to creativity
research is to use neuroimaging to identify brain features (struc-
tural and functional) which differ between individuals deemed
as being high or low on a trait of creativity as assessed by various
measures (e.g., psychometric tests, peer evaluations). We focus on
structural measures below.
WHY STRUCTURAL STUDIES?
One of the tasks facing research in the field of creativity is the
difficulty in measuring such a complex entity. Proxy measures
such as divergent thinking tasks have been heavily relied upon
in the laboratory, though they are at best a measure of creative
potential and cannot assess lifetime creative output or impact of
creative products (Piffer, 2012). For this reason, the neurosciences
have begun to look for highly reliable and valid ways to mea-
sure creative cognition. It is essential to any scientific endeavor
that reproducible results are obtained so that new information
can be effectively shared with the scientific community, thus to
build upon the foundation of scientific knowledge. Without reli-
able results, unmeasured error can be incorporated into the data
set and ultimately hinder the progress of scientific knowledge
(Bennett and Miller, 2010). While there are a growing number
of neuroimaging techniques available for research on creativity,
this paper limits its scope to highly reliable and reproducible
test methods and results. The essence of this review is to sum-
marize the best results this field has to offer from sMRI, DTI,
and proton magnetic resonance imaging (1H-MRS). In addition,
the results of lesion studies, considered the “gold standard” of
brain-behavioral studies, are discussed.
First, morphometric measures were used to analyze cor-
relations between cortical thickness and creative achievement.
Wonderlick et al. showed that surface maps of cortical thick-
ness were highly reproducible with Intra-class correlation anal-
yses ≥0.95. More recently, side-by-side comparisons of the three
volumetric segmentation algorithms (Voxel Base Morphometry,
FreeSurfer, and FAST) found extremely high reliability for the
first two algorithms (≥0.99), with FAST being ≥0.90, with all
segmentation techniques tending to underestimate gray mat-
ter volume (Eggert et al., 2012). Second, spectroscopic studies
are presented to demonstrate the relationship between labora-
tory measures of creativity and the concentrations of N-acetyl-
aspartate (NAA), a biomarker for neuronal integrity. In a study
conducted by Gasparovic et al. to assess the test–retest relia-
bility and reproducibility of 1H magnetic resonance spectro-
scopic imaging (1H-MRSI), the tissue-specific estimates of NAA
metabolite were obtained with high reliability and reproducibil-
ity with interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) values ≥0.90
(Gasparovic et al., 2011). DTI was utilized to assess whether white
matter integrity, and structural connectivity, measured using frac-
tional anisotrophy (FA), was related to composite creativity scores
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(Jung et al., 2010a). Danielian et al. showed that fiber tracking
measurement has excellent inter-rater reliability and test–retest
precision demonstrating ICCs ≥0.77 for all evaluated tracts
(Danielian et al., 2010). The results from these studies indicate
that the test measures discussed in this review are highly accurate
and impactful.
WHERE DOWE BEGIN LOOKING IN THE BRAIN FOR
SOURCES OF CREATIVE COGNITION?
Neurological inquiries regarding creativity have tended to focus
upon whether the frontal lobes are engaged or whether more pos-
terior brain regions (Heilman et al., 2003) or subcortical struc-
tures such as the basal ganglia are more predominant (Dietrich,
2004; Flaherty, 2005). From these myriad perspectives have
emerged several attempts designed to capture the neuroscience of
creativity, based largely on data gleaned from neurological and
psychiatric patients and largely confined to artistic expression
(Pollack et al., 2007). Indeed, de novo artistic expression have been
associated with left fronto-temporal (Finkelstein et al., 1991) and
right temporal lobe epilepsy (Mendez, 2005), several case stud-
ies of fronto-temporal lobe dementia (FTLD) (Miller et al., 1998,
2000; Thomas Anterion et al., 2002), a case of Parkinson’s dis-
ease treated with dopaminergic agonists (Schrag and Trimble,
2001), and a single case of subarachnoid hemorrhage (Lythgoe
et al., 2005). Miller postulates that the selective atrophy of the
anterior temporal and basal frontal lobes that accompanies FTD
may reduce inhibition of the more posteriorly located visual
systems, resulting in the patients’ heightened interest in artistic
works (Miller et al., 1998). Similarly, in a patient with primary
progressive aphasia, a profound increase in artistic interest and
ability coincided with significant atrophy of the left inferolateral
frontal cortex (Seeley et al., 2008). However, subsequent system-
atic study of artistic ability associated with the various dementias
found no general increase in creativity to be linked with fronto-
temporal dementia (or semantic or dementia of the Alzheimer’s
type), with the authors noting that “despite the existence of these
isolated patients with increased artistic production, however, apa-
thy leading to diminished creativity is more clinically typical of
patients with FTLD, suggesting that these case studies may be the
exception rather than the rule (Rankin et al., 2007).
In contrast to fronto-temporal degenerative facilitation of
artistic creativity, other lesion studies have indicated that certain
parietal lesions can lead to reduced creative ability, at least within
the visual arts. Lewy Body Dementia is a disease that is char-
acterized by progressive degeneration of visuo-spatial skills and
constructional abilities. In a case study presented by Drago et al.,
a 78-year-old visual artist experienced gradual reduction in his
ability to express his artistic subject matter. This loss of expres-
sion was attributed to cellular deterioration of the parietal lobes.
Throughout the progression of his disease, the artist preserved the
ability to create novel works of art, which is proposed to coin-
cide with preserved frontal lobe function. This case study seems
to provide support for the importance of visuospatial cortical net-
works in artistic creation and ultimately the parietal lobes (Drago
et al., 2006).
What these disparate lesions have to say about the creative pro-
cess, particularly as related to creative cognition, is hard to say
other than to speculate regarding the likely disinhibitory nature of
lesions located within an eloquent network producing increased
behavioral output. For example, Flaherty notes that the tempo-
ral lobes modulate creative drive, but notes also that changes
to the temporal lobes characterize other neurological syndromes
including hypergraphia, pressured speech, hypomania, and even
hallucinations (p. 149, Table 1). She further states that: “to a first
approximation” the corticocortical connections between frontal
and temporal lobes are “mutually inhibitory” (p. 149, Figure 1)
(Flaherty, 2005). We interpret this to imply that, with regard to a
possible neurological framework underlying creativity, we must
look not only to increased neural tissue in key brain regions,
but perhaps also to some mismatch between mutually excita-
tory and inhibitory brain regions that form a network subserving
such complex human behaviors as preparation, incubation, illu-
mination, and verification components of creative cognition. This
notion of a delicate interplay of both increases and decreases
in neural mass, white matter organization, biochemical com-
position, and even functional activations within and between
brain lobes and hemispheres is an important notion, critical to a
full understanding of the neurological underpinnings of creative
cognition.
STRUCTURAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (sMRI)
The brain is not easily parceled into segmented regions in spite of
the elegant cellular organization articulated by Brodmann (1905).
Indeed, the accurate measurement of cortical and subcortical
tissue volumes, thickness, and density has only been recently real-
ized with the advent of voxel based morphometry (VBM) and
extended with analysis techniques including, but not limited to,
FreeSurfer (surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu). VBM is a method by
which standard T1 images may be automatically segmented into
tissue compartments (i.e., gray, white, cerebrospinal fluid) using
measures of voxel intensity at the millimeter level of resolution
(Ashburner and Friston, 2000). Images from individual subjects
are imported into a freely available analysis program (i.e., statisti-
cal parametric mapping, or SPM), spatially normalized in stereo-
tactic space (i.e., Montreal Neurological Institute), segmented
and smoothed, and subjected to voxel-wise statistical compar-
isons with either a comparison group or an external variable
(Ashburner and Friston, 2000).
sMRI was utilized to hypothesize a link between the results
of divergent thinking and creative achievement test and corti-
cal thickness (Jung et al., 2010c). Subjects participating in this
study were administered the creative achievement questionnaire
(CAQ)1, an objective and reliable measure of creative productiv-
ity (Carson et al., 2005) in addition to three different divergent
thinking tasks. Each subject’s creative products were assessed by
three independent judges and scored on a composite creativity
index (CCI) (Amabile, 1982)—consensual assessment technique.
Finally, sMRI was used to investigate the correlation between
creativity scores and cortical thickness. Results indicated that
increased gray matter thickness in the right posterior cingulate
1Although see Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) for relationship of CAQ to
Openness/Intellect. Also note that CAQ is heavily weighted toward artistic
creativity, especially in college-aged sample.
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Table 1 | Structural studies reviewed.
Author (date) N Proxy test measures Higher brain integrity-higher creativity Lower brain integrity-higher
creativity
MORPHOMETRY STUDIES
Jung et al.
(2010a,b,c)
61 Three divergent thinking
tasks: design fluency test,
four line condition of the DFT,
uses of objects test
R. posterior cingulate L. lingual gyrus, R. fusiform,
R. cuneus, R. angular gyrus,
R. vertices form inferior parietal,
superior parietal and lateral occipital
Creative achievement test R. angular gyrus L. lateral orbitofrontal
Takeuchi et al.
(2010a,b)
55 S-A creativity test
—————————————–
Raven’s advanced progressive
matrix
Regional gray matter volume: R.
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral
striate, a cluster that includes the dorsal
midbrain, the reticular formation, the
periaqueductal gray, the ventral midbrain
(substantia nigra and ventral tegmental
area), and regions in the precuneus
Gansler et al.
(2011)
18 Torrance test of creative
thinking
R. parietal lobe Corpus callosum area (splenium
region)
SPECTROSCOPY STUDIES
Jung et al.
(2009a,b)
56 Three divergent thinking
tasks: design fluency test,
four line condition of the DFT,
uses of objects test
L. anterior gray matter NAA R. anterior gray matter NAA
Controlled oral word
association test (COWAT)
Wechsler abbreviated scale of
intelligence (WASI)
NEO factor five inventory:
neuroticism, extraversion,
openness, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness
DIFFUSION TENSOR IMAGING
Jung et al.
(2010a,b,c)
72 Four divergent thinking tasks:
verbal and drawing creativity
tests, four line condition of the
DFT, uses of objects test, and
generation of captions to a
New Yorker Magazine cartoon
FA within predominantly left inferior
frontal white matter (i.e., regions
overlapping the uncinate fasciculus
and anterior thalamic radiation)
Wechsler abbreviated scale of
intelligence (WASI)
NEO factor five inventory:
neuroticism, extraversion,
openness, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness
FA within the right frontal white
matter (i.e., regions overlapping the
uncinate fasciculus and anterior
thalamic radiation)
Takeuchi et al.
(2010a,b)
55 S-A creativity test
—————————————–
Raven’s advanced progressive
matrix
Frontal lobe, anterior cingulate cortex
bilaterally extending into the body of the
corpus callosum, white matter regions
adjacent to the anterior part of the bilateral
inferior parietal lobe and a white matter
region extending into the right
temporo-parietal junction from the frontal
lobe (arcuate fasciculus) and the right
occipital lobe
(Continued)
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 330 | 4
Jung et al. The structure of creative cognition in the human brain
Table 1 | Continued
Author (date) Lesion location/N Proxy test measures Lower brain integrity-lower
creativity
Lower brain
integrity-higher creativity
LESION STUDIES
Shamay-Tsoory
et al. (2011)
Medial prefrontal cortex
lesion (mPFC) N = 12
Neuropsychological assessment,
torrance test of creative thinking,
alternate uses test
R. mPFC lesions were
associated with impaired
originality
Inferior frontal gyrus
lesion (IFG) N = 7
L. IFG lesions exhibited high
originality scores
mPFC and IFG lesions
N = 6
Posterior lesions (PC)
involving damage in the
temporoparietal, inferior
parietal, or superior
parietal lobule N = 15
Positive correlation between
lesions in the left PC and
originality scores
Abraham et al.
(2012b)
Frontal lobe: frontal lobe
extensive (FL-EXT),
frontal lobe lateral
(FL-LAT), frontal lobe
polor and/or orbital
(FL-ORB). N = 29
Torrance test of creative thinking,
alternate uses test
Poor performance on fluency,
originality and creative imagery
FL-POL performed better on
constraints of examples tests
Basal ganglia (BG)
N = 16
Poor performance on
originality, practicality and
incremental problem solving
Superior performance on the
constraints of examples test
Parietal-temporal lobe
(PTL) N = 11
Poor Performance on fluency,
practicality and constraints of
examples
R., right hemisphere; L., left hemisphere; DFT, design fluency test; NAA, N-acetylaspartate; COWAT, controlled oral word association test; WASI, Wechsler abbrevi-
ated scale of intelligence; FA, fractional anisotropy; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; PC, posterior cortex; FL-EXT, frontal lobe - extensive;
FL-LAT, frontal lobe - lateral; FL-ORB, frontal lobe - orbital; FL-POL, frontal lobe - polar; BG, basal ganglia; PTL, parietal-temporal lobe.
gyrus and the right angular gyrus correlated positively with higher
CCI and CAQ performance respectively. Conversely, there were
several areas that had a negative relationship with CCI and
CAQ scores, in that decreased cortical thickness was associated
with higher creativity scores. Decreased thickness within regions
including the left frontal lobe, lingual, cuneus, angular, inferior
parietal and fusiform gyri predicted performance on the CCI. For
CAQ, there was only one area where decreased cortical thickness
related to higher scores; the left lateral orbitofrontal region. These
results appear to indicate that information flow between many
different areas of the brain may be necessary to the development
of creative ideation and achievement respectively (Jung et al.,
2010c). Unlike other studies of ability (e.g., Draganski et al.,
2004), the novel finding of this report was that decreased corti-
cal thickness in discrete areas of the frontal and posterior cortical
regions, was associated with increased creative ability.
Takeuchi et al. set out to study the relationship between
regional gray matter volume (rGMV) in subcortical regions and
individual creativity. All subjects (42M, 13F) were administered
the S-A creativity test, designed to evaluate creativity using three
DT tasks, and assigned a total creativity score (Takeuchi et al.,
2010a). Moreover, the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrix, a
psychometric test of general intelligence that is well correlated
with general IQ test results (Raven, 1994), was used to measure
each subjects intellectual capacity. These results were compared
with morphometric data collected via MRI and revealed sig-
nificant, positive correlation with creativity scores in the fol-
lowing regions: right dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC),
bilateral striatum, the dorsal midbrain, the reticular formation,
the periaqueductal gray (PAG), the ventral midbrain (substan-
tia nigra and ventral tegmental area) and regions in the pre-
cuneus. The authors interpret their findings of increased fGMV
in the dopaminergic systems of the brain to correspond with the
notion that the complex construct of creativity requires diverse
cognitive abilities, such as working memory, sustained atten-
tion, cognitive flexibility and fluency in the generation of ideas.
It should be noted that these results are in contrast to those
reported by Jung et al., in the same year: How could this be?
One explanation could be the very high predominance of male
subjects in the Takeuchi sample (3M:1F) as compared to the
Jung sample (∼1M:1F). Given numerous previous studies show-
ing sex differences associated with brain-behavior relationships
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FIGURE 1 | Graphical display of studies reviewed: Blue, lower brain
integrity measures associated with higher creativity measures; Red,
higher brain integrity measures associated with higher creativity
measures; (A) left lateral hemisphere; (B) left medial hemisphere;
(C) right lateral hemisphere; (D) right medial hemisphere; Abra,
Abraham et al., 2012a; Mill, Miller et al., 1998; Gans, Gansler et al.,
2011; Sham, Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2011; Take, Takeuchi et al.,
2010a,b.
(Yurgelun-Todd et al., 2002; Haier et al., 2005; Jung et al., 2005;
Schmithorst, 2009; Wang et al., 2012), the comparability of these
studies should be interpreted with caution. Other reasons could
also explain the differences between the results, including dif-
ferent divergent thinking tasks used, different analysis methods
employed, and different imaging parameters, to name a few.
Future studies will help to determine more consistent relation-
ships between white matter integrity and creativity.
Finally, Gansler et al. hypothesized that the torrance test of
creative thinking (TTCT), one of the most commonly accepted
methods to measure visual and verbal DT production tasks
(Torrance, 1974) should be linked to cortical volume in special-
ized areas (Gansler et al., 2011). This cohort (18M) was given
the TTCT, to assess visuospatial creativity before their brain
scans were subjected to VBM analysis. Results of their investi-
gation showed significantly increased gray matter tissue volume
in the right superior parietal lobe corresponded with higher
TTCT scores. Additionally, the study showed that the splenium
of the corpus callosum, responsible for connection the parietal
and occipital lobes, negatively correlated with TTCT scores. This
study emphasizes the importance of the visuospatial processing of
the parietal lobe and its underlying white matter pathways to the
generation of creative products (Gansler et al., 2011). Again, as
this study included only male subjects, its generalizability should
be interpreted with caution.
What these three morphological studies of creativity show
is rather striking. Unlike studies of most cognitive capacities,
including intelligence, where greater ability is associated with
increased cortical thickness and/or volume (e.g., Draganski et al.,
2004; Haier et al., 2005), creative cognition appears to be
associated with both increases and decreases in cortical thickness
and/or volume across a broad network of brain regions. Increases
were observed in a network or regions corresponding to the mid-
brain, striatum, precuneus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Takeuchi et al., 2010a), superior parietal lobule (Gansler et al.,
2011), and posterior cingulate and right angular gyrus (Jung et al.,
2010b), while decreases were observed in the lingual, cuneus,
angular, inferior parietal, fusiform gyri, and orbitofrontal cortex
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(Jung et al., 2010b), as well as the splenium of the corpus callo-
sum (Gansler et al., 2011). The increases may be related to male
gender as the two studies that found cortical increases associated
with creative cognition were stilted toward males. Finally, there
is a rather large correspondence of brain regions identified in
these three studies and regions within and overlapping the default
mode network (DMN) (Raichle and Snyder, 2007), including
the precuneus, inferior parietal lobes, and medial/orbital frontal
cortices.
MAGNETIC RESONANCE SPECTROSCOPY STUDY
Proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy (1H-MRS) is an imag-
ing technique that allows for neurochemistry of a research subject
to be assessed in vivo. N-acetylaspartate (NAA) is a metabolite
that is frequently used as a marker of neuronal integrity (Moffett
et al., 2007). Studies have shown that high concentration of NAA
in the brain is associated with higher cognitive function (Ross
and Sachdev, 2004) and intelligence in normal subjects (Jung
et al., 1999). Jung et al. used 1H-MRS to determine whether
neurometabolites such as NAA could be used to predict creative
ability (Jung et al., 2009b) as relationships had previously been
demonstrated between this metabolite and intellectual capacity
(Jung et al., 1999, 2005). As in the previous studies by this group,
CCI and NEO-FFI (Openness) scores were obtained for each par-
ticipant as proxy measures of creativity. The data set was assessed
for relationships between behavioral and spectroscopic measures
obtained from regions superior to the lateral ventricles, including
white matter metabolites from frontal and parietal regions, and
gray matter metabolites from the anterior and posterior cingulate
cortices.
In support of the threshold effect, this study found differential
metabolic profiles supporting performance on the CCI at verbal
IQ’s above and below a cutoff of 116: higher NAA within the left
anterior cingulate predicted higher CCI performance in subjects
with VIQ >116, while lower NAA with the right anterior cin-
gulate predicted better CCI performance in subjects with VIQ
≤116. Previous behavioral studies have noted that below an IQ
of 120, creativity and intelligence are weakly (∼0.30) correlated,
while above 120, the correlation approaches zero—the so-called
“threshold hypothesis” (Guilford, 1967). This was the first bio-
logical support for the threshold hypothesis observed in a human
cohort, and suggested different cognitive mechanisms associated
with divergent thinking. In higher IQ subjects, it was hypoth-
esized that “central (i.e., cingulate) facilitation of more refined
access to discrete left hemisphere semantic networks” was pre-
dominant, while in lower IQ subjects “disinhibition of large right
hemisphere semantic networks” predominated. Within the larger
context of structural creativity studies, we interpret these find-
ings to support a strong role for the anterior cingulate gyrus in
“gating” the flow of information within prefrontal cortices dur-
ing the “blind variation” component of creative cognition, which
is well captured by measures of divergent thinking. The cingulate
gyrus is part of the so-called “salience network,” which includes
the anterior cingulate and insula, and is involved in a wide range
of cognitive functions (e.g., initiation, motivation, goal directed
behavior) (Devinsky et al., 1995). More specifically, and relevant
to the current discussion, the dorsal anterior cingulate has been
associated with orienting attention to the most relevant envi-
ronmental stimuli involved with intra- and extra-personal events
(Bressler and Menon, 2010).
DIFFUSION TENSOR IMAGING STUDIES
The relative contribution of white matter to higher cognitive
functioning has remained relatively understudied compared to
gray matter research linking particular cortical regions to per-
formance. However, several lines of inquiry would suggest that
the integrity of myelinated axons plays a critical role in intellec-
tual attainment (Miller, 1994). For example, myelin thickness is
correlated to axonal size (Bishop and Smith, 1964; Friede and
Samorajski, 1967), and larger axonal diameter is associated with
increased nerve conduction speed (Aboitiz, 1992). The simulta-
neous increases in myelination and axonal diameter have been
hypothesized to play a critical role in cognitive development. One
imaging modality particularly amenable to measurement white
matter integrity is DTI, an imaging technique that measures the
coherence of water movement through the white matter of the
brain and that can facilitate in vivo white matter fiber tracking
(Mori and van Zijl, 2002). Since the diffusion of water down the
axon is faster than it would be in the perpendicular direction, it
can be presumed that the axonal membrane and myelin sheath
exist as the main barrier to perpendicular diffusion. Therefore,
the diffusion is anisotropic meaning that the diffusion rates differ
based on direction (Pierpaoli and Basser, 1996; Pierpaoli et al.,
1996). Fractional Anisotropy (FA) is considered to be an over-
all measure of axonal integrity and therefore a higher FA value
indicates greater axonal coherence and/or myelination of the
axon. Patients with neurological disorders (e.g., multiple sclero-
sis, stroke) tend to show reduced FA indicating disruption of axon
and myelin microstructure in the tissue (Danielian et al., 2010).
In effort to explore the relationship between creativity and
the microstructure of the brain’s white matter, Takeuchi et al.
used DTI to determine whether white matter integrity is related
to proxy measures of creativity. Similar to the morphometry
study conducted by Takeuchi et al. subjects were administered
the S-A creativity test, assigned a total creativity score, and
given the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrix intelligence test
(Raven, 1994). Results showed that increased structural integrity
and connectivity involving the frontal lobe and corpus collosum
was positively and significantly correlated with higher creativity
scores. Additionally, positive correlation was measured in the
white matter of the bilateral striatum, the right temporal-parietal
junction, the anterior part of the bilateral inferior parietal lobes
and the right occipital lobe. This data indicates that white matter
pathways facilitate creative thinking through “efficient integra-
tion of information” and “diverse high-level cognitive function”
(Takeuchi et al., 2010b). The frontal lobe is responsible for many
functions that are associated with creativity. Diverse cognitive
abilities, regulated by the frontal lobe, such as working mem-
ory, sustained attention, idea generation and cognitive flexibility
are vital to breaking old conventions and developing new pat-
terns of thinking. Positive correlation between FA and the corpus
callosum support the theory that interhemispheric connectiv-
ity is essential for information integration and the expansion of
creative thought (Carlsson et al., 1994; Atchley et al., 1999).
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Jung et al. also utilized DTI to evaluate white matter contribu-
tion to creative cognition (Jung et al., 2010a). Subjects who par-
ticipated in this study took part in four DT tasks that were ranked
by four independent judges and a CCI was derived. Importantly,
none of the subjects suffered from any current or previous
neurological or psychiatric disorder. Each subject also took the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence assessment and a self-
administered personality test (NEO-FFI) to measure normal per-
sonality functioning and openness to experience. These results
were compared to diffusion tensor images to analyze data corre-
lations. Researchers found that in normal subjects, lower levels
of FA within left inferior frontal white matter (i.e., regions over-
lapping the uncinate fasiculus and anterior thalamic radiation)
scored higher on the CCI. Those subjects with lower levels of FA
within the right frontal white matter scored higher of the mea-
sures of openness assessed in the self-administered personality
test. Interestingly, schizophrenic and bipolar patients have also
been shown to have decreased FA in these ROIs (Haznedar et al.,
2005; Sussmann et al., 2009) suggesting that creativity may exist
upon a continuum with psychopathology as other have proposed
(Nettle and Clegg, 2006; Miller and Tal, 2007).
LESION STUDIES
While neuroimaging studies have become increasingly vital to
the analysis of neural networks involved in creativity, lesion
studies have always been viewed as the “gold standard” of brain-
behavioral studies in that they have the capacity to directly
demonstrate which areas of the brain are central to cognitive
functioning (Harlow, 1848; Broca, 1861; MacKay et al., 1998).
Shamay-Tsoory et al. set out to localize creative thinking by
comparing TTCT and neuropsychological test results of control
patients with those of patients with localized lesions (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2011). The results infer that an original thought pro-
cess is the product of unique idea generation and the inhibition
of stereotypical thinking. While lesions in the right medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), were found to parallel profound impair-
ment of creativity and originality measures, originality scores
were higher when associated with left inferior frontal and pos-
terior lesions. This may indicate that while the right PFC is
responsible for generating unique ideas, it is in competition with
those areas (specifically the left inferior frontal gyrus, left tem-
poroparietal region and the left inferior parietal lobe) that are
key to the production of language and the storage of logical,
linear and automatic knowledge. This competition in healthy
patients may actually inhibit the formation of creative thought.
Therefore, in patients with lesions in the left language areas,
the lack of inhibition of the right PFC may facilitate creative
expression.
Abraham et al. studied neurological patients having suffered
various strokes to determine the impact of lesion location on cre-
ative performance (Abraham et al., 2012a). Patients with lesions
in the frontal lobe, basal ganglia and parietal-temporal lobes were
matched with controls and administered standard creativity tasks
(e.g., Alternate Uses Task, Remote Associates Test) as well as mea-
sures of specific aspects of creative cognition (e.g., conceptual
expansion, originality, practicality, insight). The frontal lobe was
further divided into subgroups to investigate the specific roles
of the sections of the frontal lobe in creative thought: extensive
frontal lesions (EXT), lateral frontal lesions (LAT) and frontopo-
lar and orbital lesions (POL) (Abraham et al., 2012a). From the
alternate uses test, the authors found that the LAT patients were
the only ones to perform significantly worse on measures of
originality and fluency. This data suggests that the frontolateral
portion of the frontal lobe is specifically involved in the genera-
tion of both novel and appropriate creative responses. Parietal-
temporal lobe lesions were associated with lower alternate uses
fluency, lower constraint of examples practicality, and poorer
performance on the constraints of examples test (i.e., inhibiting
prepotent responses when given examples of divergent thinking
items) (Finke et al., 1996). Basal ganglia lesions were associated
with lower alternate uses originality, lower constraint of examples
practicality, and lower incremental problem solving ability. This
finding fits well with the literature postulated a primary func-
tion of the basal ganglia in inhibitory control (Aron et al., 2007).
Interestingly, the basal ganglia group performed better on the
constraints of examples test (i.e., they were able to suppress the
example given) better than controls. This may indicate that the
inattention and distractibility often associated with basal gan-
glia lesion provide an advantage when performing these tests.
Increased distractibility may allow this group of patients to divert
their attention past the constraint posed by salient information
and increase their performance. A similar study, conducted with
chronic schizophrenia patients, a disease characterized by dis-
organization of semantic thought, showed a positive correlation
between the degree of thought disorder symptoms exhibited by
this sample and performance on the constraints of examples task
(Abraham et al., 2007). Finally, the POL group performed better
than controls on the constraints of examples task. This finding
is in contrast to the Shamay-Tsoory et al. finding that lesion of
the mPFC was anti-correlated with creativity scores, although
it should be noted that the discrepancies may be due to the
differences in lesion overlap and/or the very different cognitive
constructs tapped by the measures of “creativity” across studies
(Abraham et al., 2012a).
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
There has been a relatively long effort (∼50 years) to localize cre-
ative processes within the human brain. Early work by Sperry and
Gazzaniga with split brain patients (patients undergoing surgery
to section the corpus callosum and commissures) demonstrated
that the left and right hemispheres of the brain functioned inde-
pendently from one another, and that “interaction through the
commissures may have some particular importance for artistic
drawing in the normal brain” (p. 136)—one of the many progen-
itors, no doubt, for the erroneous “right brain” locus of creativity
(Gazzaniga and Sperry, 1967). Certainly the frontal lobe has
garnered significant attention, with theories postulating fronto-
subcortical modulation of catecholamines (Heilman et al., 2003),
fronto-temporal mismatch producing increased creative drive
(Flaherty, 2005, 2011), to the rather nebulous notion that “cre-
ativity is not particularly associated with any single brain region,
the prefrontal cortex excluded” (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). Then,
there are inferences that certain aspects of creativity (e.g., insight,
creative achievement) might be amenable to precise localization
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(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Jung et al., 2010c). These notions are
all unlikely, as the brain does not carry out cognitive function by
means of neuronal-axonal activity in discrete zones, lobes, or even
hemispheres.
The brain does appear, however, to function in a manner con-
sistent with the notion of “networks” or hubs (Buckner et al.,
2009; Bressler and Menon, 2010), and this conceptualization is
likely to yield more fruit in terms of brain-behavior associations
with regard to creative cognition. Indeed, the brain is orga-
nized in such a way (e.g., lobes) that optimization occurs for
different types of information processing (e.g., visual-occipital,
auditory-temporal, sensory-parietal), with heteromodal associ-
ation cortices binding together sensory information converging
frommultiple sources (Mesulam, 1998). More recently, it was dis-
covered that a small number of regions within the brain, called
“hubs,” possessed disproportionately large numbers of connec-
tions to other brain regions (Sporns et al., 2007), thus serving to
optimize brain connectivity, and thus information transfer, across
long distances (Bassett and Bullmore, 2006). These hubs can even
be seen to form “networks” of brain regions corresponding to
stimulus-independent thought (i.e., DMN), stimulus-dependent
thought [i.e., cognitive control network (CCN)], and switching
of attention between salient environmental stimuli (i.e., salience
network) (Bressler and Menon, 2010). By applying the notion
of “hubs” and “networks” to target cognitive processes neuro-
scientists within the creativity field are far more likely to link
target constructs (e.g., BVSR) to specific measures (e.g., concep-
tual expansion) critically dependent upon fundamental neural
networks (e.g., semantic network) (Kroger et al., 2012).
In his delightful book “The Art of Thought” Graham Wallace
(p. 42) heralds a critical notion of creative cognition in the fol-
lowing passage: “The cortex of the upper brain may, for instance,
of its own initiative, to satisfy its own need of activity, and to
carry out its own function in the organism as a whole, start
the process of thought without waiting for the primitive stim-
ulus of sensation” (Wallace, 1931). The importance and role of
“task unrelated thoughts” (Giambra, 1989) in reasoning and cog-
nition have been the source of wonder and introspection for
centuries among philosophers and, more recently, psychologists.
Only very recently have neuroscientists discovered brain mech-
anisms that appear to underlie such “task unrelated thoughts”
namely the DMN, which appear to correspond with “stimulus-
independent thought” (McGuire et al., 1996). Indeed, the DMN
has been associated with a broad range of task unrelated thoughts
including: “remembering the past, envisioning future events,
and considering the thoughts and perspectives of other people”
(Buckner et al., 2008). For this reason, we hypothesize that the
DMN is a good “first approximation” of a network that would
serve well the purpose of BVSR in service of creative cognition.
Indeed, this DMN cognitive “system” provides two of the three
necessary conditions stipulated by Campbell in his BVSR concep-
tualization, namely: (1) “a mechanism for introducing variation,”
and (2) “amechanism for preserving and reproducing the selected
variations” (p. 381), both achieved through mental manipulation
and simulation (Campbell, 1960). Dean Keith Simonton has fur-
ther refined Campbell’s notion of BVSR, with the added notion
of sequential BVSR, with Exploratory and Eliminatory aspects
(Simonton, 2013). This type of sequential back-and-forth which
begins with “informed guesses” and progresses to increasingly
probable solutions can best be simulated within a network of
brain regions not devoted to ongoing cognition serving environ-
mental demands: namely the DMN.
But how well does the data fit the hypothesis? We have ren-
dered Figure 1 to summarize the results from the structural and
lesion studies reviewed above: what emerges is a figure that begins
to resemble large scale cortical networks, particularly the DMN
and associated hubs (Buckner et al., 2008; Bressler and Menon,
2010). However the fit is not perfect, as would be expected
given that the DMN is a large network involved in “constructing
dynamic mental simulations based on personal past experiences
such as used during remembering thinking about the future,
and generally when imagining alternative perspectives and sce-
narios to the present” (p. 18/19) (Buckner et al., 2008). While
the DMN is a good “first approximation” of brain networks
necessary for BVSR, it is not sufficient to explain the strong
interplay between DMN and other hubs (e.g., semantic networks
as implicated in Figure 1 top left) (Lau et al., 2008). We do
note that the studies represented in the upper left hand panel
of Figure 1 (overlapping the semantic network) represents: (1)
higher subject Creative Achievement in normal college subjects
(Jung et al., 2010c), higher creative drive (in FTD patients) (Miller
et al., 1998), and higher originality scores in lesioned patients
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2011), thus suggesting some generality
of findings across measures of creative cognition with respect to
lower brain network integrity. All of these behaviors conform
to sequential BVSR, involving both exploratory and eliminatory
processes, as re-conceptualized by Dean Keith Simonton. And
finally, the brain does not “devote” regions to certain cognitive
tasks, but rather constantly reuses, co-opts, and optimizes alloca-
tion of neural resources toward the demands of ongoing thought
processes. Thus, the DMN appears to have been co-opted (or
co-evolved) for the purpose of BVSR, with other hubs pulled in
as task demands dictate. The production of something “novel
and useful” appears to depend, at least in part, on disinhibitory
neuronal processes within this core network, while excitatory pro-
cesses (i.e., more refinement of ideas or selective retention) would
appear to depend on the CCN. This would be a plausible alloca-
tion of cognitive resources with DMN devoted to the innovation
and blind variation mechanisms associated with the “construct-
ing of dynamic mental simulations,” while the CCN would be
engaged to test retained innovations within the framework of the
external environment. This would also be consistent with cogni-
tive research showing a role for dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in
“implementation of control” mechanisms, while the anterior cin-
gulate is engaged during performance monitoring (MacDonald
et al., 2000). Creative cognition is like other types of cogni-
tion, only more specialized in a terms of its focus (i.e., often
domain specific) and type of adaptive problem solving (i.e., often
abductive as opposed to deductive reasoning).
There is a relatively long and consistent effort to link arousal
with creative cognition, with early studies showing decreased cre-
ative ideation associated with increased arousal induced by stress
(Krop et al., 1969), brainstorming (i.e., social stress) (Lindgren
and Lindgren, 1965a,b), and intense white noise (Martindale and
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Greenough, 1973). This general observation, led to the hypoth-
esis that decreased cortical arousal was associated with increased
creative cognition, a notion supported by numerous electroen-
cephalographic (EEG) studies (Fink and Benedek, 2012). For
example, increased alpha (a measure of lower cortical arousal)
has been associated with creative cognition in highly creative sub-
jects (compared to lower creative) (Martindale and Hines, 1975).
Also note that subjects with decreased “latent inhibition” (i.e.,
the ability to screen from current attention stimuli previously
tagged as irrelevant), have been found to have increased creative
achievement (Carson et al., 2003), and rely more on intuition
in implicit problem solving (Kaufman, 2009). This notion of
“disinhibition” of cognitive control mechanisms associated with
creativity was first formulated as a “syndrome” by Martindale
(Martindale, 1971), with the creative person showing lower lev-
els of frontal inhibition (Martindale, 1989). This notion has great
appeal, comports well with the data, and even corresponds well
with “folk psychology” notions of the creative process (i.e., the
warmbath of Archimedes, the long walks of Beethoven, the dream
state of Kekulé, the drug taking (i.e., drinking) of Hemingway,
etc.) that all serve to downregulate externally directed cognition
and upregulate exploratory idea spaces. Importantly, this “dis-
inhibition” likely corresponds to both BVSR aspect of creative
cognition, although the bias would be toward elaboration, where
multiple ideas can be generated in an environment lacking refine-
ment, formal testing, or selection pressures. Our research tends to
support the notion that some normal brains, performing better
on standard creativity measures, are more “disinhibited” in their
organization, with certain regions having lower cortical volume
(Jung et al., 2010c), lower white matter fidelity (Jung et al., 2010a),
and (at or below a verbal IQ of 116) anterior cingulate bio-
chemistry tending to “gate” frontal information flow (Jung et al.,
2009a). Certain clinical entities (particularly semantic dementia)
and lesions within isolated anterior frontal and inferior parietal
brain regions support the notion of disinhibitory facilitation of
blind variation serving creative cognition (Miller et al., 1998;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2011; Abraham et al., 2012a). However,
other research groups have not found strong evidence to support
such a hypothesis of frontal disinhibition subserving blind varia-
tion in creative cognition (Takeuchi et al., 2010a,b; Gansler et al.,
2011).
Raichle described the discovery of this “default mode of brain
function” as a “problem” to the neurosciences in that activ-
ity decreases were associated with cognition within a discrete
network of brain regions (p. 1085) (Raichle and Snyder, 2007).
A similar “problem” exists within the cognitive neuroscience
of creativity: namely how to account for the growing number
of studies showing decreased cortical thickness/volume or white
matter integrity associated with increased human cognitive abil-
ity. More neurons and/or dendritic arborization or thicker myelin
corresponding to higher levels of cognitive capacity makes intu-
itive sense. Decreased brain integrity (as commonly understood)
associated with higher levels of ability, requires a mechanistic
framework by which such relationships can make sense. We shall
lay out such a mechanistic framework in a future paper. Suffice it
to say that the current results support a disinhibitory bias within
a network of brain regions that normally stand in excitatory and
inhibitory balance, corresponding to those commonly observed
within the DMN (including the anterior-inferior frontal cortex,
inferior parietal cortex, and anterior temporal cortex). This DMN
normally serves to “instantiates the maintenance of information
for interpreting, responding to and even predicting environmen-
tal demands (p. 1087).” It is described as a “Bayesian inference
engine” designed to make predictions about the future. It can also
be viewed here as serving blind variation in creative cognition.
What other evidence do we have supporting network notions
of creative cognition? While our purpose was to highlight struc-
tural imaging studies, two recent functional imaging studies bears
mentioning. Limb and Braun studied six full-time musicians
using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) while they
either performed overlearned or improvised piano pieces (Limb
and Braun, 2008). They found that spontaneous improvisation
was associated with widespread deactivation of the lateral pre-
frontal cortex along with simultaneous activation of medial
frontal cortex, and describe this finding as “intrinsic to the cre-
ative process,” being “innovative, internally motivated production
of novel material” (p. e1679). In a replication and extension of
this work, researchers had rap musicians either perform over-
learned lyrics (repeated condition) in the scanner or to create
rap on the fly (improvised condition) (Liu et al., 2012). Twelve
male freestyle artists were studied. Again, they found a disso-
ciation of activity between brain regions: increased activation
within the mPFC and simultaneous decreases within the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, with subsequent analyses showing
concurrent activation within the anterior cingulate gyrus and cin-
gulate motor area. Connectivity analyses found that the mPFC
activation was correlated with activations across a broad network
including the amygdala, inferior frontal gyrus, and inferior pari-
etal gyrus (p. 5). Thus, this functional study of rap musicians
appears to show a back and forth between large brain networks,
with improvisation resulting in increased activation of the DMN
(and decreased activation within the CCN), as well as modula-
tion of the interplay between these two networks by the salience
network (i.e., anterior cingulate, insula, etc.). We hypothesize that
the back and forth between these two networks (default, cognitive
control) likely corresponds to the BVSR components of creative
cognition respectively. While speculative, it would be of interest
to determine whether these rap musicians had decreased corti-
cal thickness, as compared to age, sex, and IQ matched controls,
particularly within inferior parietal and anterior-inferior frontal
regions identified in Figure 1.
As others have stated farmore adamantly (Dietrich, 2004), cre-
ativity is not comprised of one cognitive process, but of many
cognitive processes, including (but not limited to) defocused
attention, mental flexibility, cognitive control, and other cognitive
constructs between the broad ranges of BVSR. The production of
something “novel and useful” appears to depend, at least in part,
on disinhibitory neuronal processes within this core network,
while excitatory processes (i.e., more refinement of ideas or selec-
tive retention) would appear to depend on the CCN. This would
be a plausible allocation of cognitive resources with DMNdevoted
to the innovation and blind variation mechanisms associated
with the “constructing of dynamic mental simulations,” while
the CCN would be engaged to test retained innovations within
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the framework of the external environment. This would also be
consistent with cognitive research showing a role for dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex in “implementation of control” mechanisms,
while the anterior cingulate is engaged during performance mon-
itoring (MacDonald et al., 2000). Creative cognition is like other
types of cognition, only more specialized in a terms of its focus
(i.e., often domain specific) and type of adaptive problem solv-
ing (i.e., often abductive as opposed to deductive reasoning). We
believe that future research, focused on disinhibitory hubs within
the DMN, will serve to move the study of creativity neuroscience
forward in a more focused manner (Buckner et al., 2009). After
all, a full understanding of creativity will only be had when we
move beyond both folk psychologies and “first approximations”
to address this important construct in its full complexity, across
domains, species, and timescales.
CONCLUSIONS
1. An appropriate, well-accepted, operational definition exists for
creative cognition: the production of something both novel and
useful.
2. Such a definition can be conceptualized within an evolutionary
framework, particularly notions of BVSR.
3. Structural imaging techniques provide a reliable framework
within which the field can begin to discuss brain traits asso-
ciated with creative cognitive abilities.
4. Both increased and decreased brain “fidelity” measures are
associated with creative cognitive abilities across a wide array
of brain regions.
5. Regions of decreased brain fidelity associated with increased
creative cognitive ability tend to correspond to the so-called
DMN as demonstrated by case studies, imaging studies, and
lesion studies.
6. Focus on cortical hubs within the DMN represents a research
opportunity to further refine the manifestation of creative
cognition in the brain.
7. The results indicate a dynamic interplay between inhibitory
and excitatory networks corresponding to cortical hubs likely
corresponding to BVSR components to creative cognition
respectively.
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